

# RESOLVING QUANTITY AND INFORMATIVENESS IMPLICATURE IN INDEFINITE REFERENCE



Till Poppels & Roger Levy

## The Phenomenon

- (1) a. The man broke a finger. +> his **OWN** finger  
b. The man injured a child. +> **not** his own child (**OTHER'S**)

OTHER'S

The man injured a child.  
The man broke a nose.  
...  
The father injured a son.  
The man broke a finger.


OWN

The X V-ed a Y.

**Research Question**  
What determines the **direction and strength** of inferences about the semantically underspecified relation between X and Y?

Atlas & Levinson (1981); Levinson (2000)

## Gricean Inferences




Centrality of *Quantity* and *Informativeness* widely recognized:

- Horn (1984): as antinomic interpretational forces
- Searle (1965): as the principle of "maximum illocutionary ends with minimum phonetic effort"
- Zipf (1949): as speaker's economy and listener's economy

Grice (1957; 1975)

## Iterative Reasoning



Frank & Goodman (2012)

## The Rational Speech Act Model

Pragmatic listener:

$$P_{L_1}(m|u) \propto P_{S_1}(u|m)P(m)$$

Gricean speaker:

$$P_{S_1}(u|m) \propto \exp(\lambda[\log(P_{L_0}(m|u)) - D(u)])$$

Literal listener:

$$P_{L_0}(m|u) \propto \mathcal{L}(u, m)P(m)$$

Scalar pressure

If utterance  $u$  is compatible with meaning  $m$ , any alternative  $u'$  exerts scalar pressure on  $u$  away from  $m$  to the extent that  $u'$  is **more precise** and **less costly** than  $u$ .



Modeling assumptions	utterance ( $u$ )	$\mathcal{L}(u, \text{OWN})$	$\mathcal{L}(u, \text{OTHER'S})$	$D(u)$
	$a$	1	1	1
	<i>self's</i>	1	0	1
	<i>someone else's</i>	0	1	4

Frank & Goodman (2012)

## Methods



The man broke a finger.  
The man broke a nose.  
The man injured a child.  
The father injured a child.  
The nurse broke a finger.  
The man shaved a leg.  
The woman shaved a leg.

Man broke finger.  
Man broke nose.  
Man injured child.  
Father injured child.  
Nurse broke finger.  
Man shaved leg.  
Woman shaved leg.

- 53 X-V-Y sentence pairs
- 2-alternative forced choice task
- event priors normed separately
- mixed logit regression

$$\text{response} \sim \text{prior} + \alpha \text{uniqueness} + \beta \text{reliability} + \text{headline} + (1 + \text{headline} | \text{item})$$

## Predictions & Results



- Interpretations should track **priors**
- Overall Q-implicature towards **OTHER'S**
- Reduced Q-implicature in **HEADLINE** versions (X V-ed A Y.)
- Amplified Q-implicature when X's Y is **unique**
- Pressure towards OWN when X and Y are highly "**relatable**"

## Discussion

### The HEADLINE effect

utterance ( $u$ )	$\mathcal{L}(u, \text{OWN})$	$\mathcal{L}(u, \text{OTHER'S})$	$D(u)$
$\emptyset$	1	1	0
<i>self's</i>	1	0	1
<i>someone else's</i>	0	1	4

Lowering the cost of the ambiguous utterance reduces the scalar pressure from both alternatives, pulling interpretations back towards OWN.

### Felicity conditions as 2-place cost function

has only 1 vs. has more than 1  
The man broke a nose. vs. The man broke a finger.  
Hawkins (1991):  
# a brightest student  
# a US president  
2-place cost functions (Jäger, 2012):  
 $D(a, \text{OWN}) > D(a, \text{OTHER'S})$   
...if X's Y is unique!

### The effect of reliability

The **man** injured a child. +> OTHER'S  
The **father** injured a child. +> OWN  
The man broke a **cup**. +> OTHER'S  
The man broke a **finger**. +> OWN

Compare:

- I almost bought a **car** today but the **engine** was too noisy.
- The manager **fired** the employee who **came in late** 7 days in a row.

- Non-intentionalist inferences likely play an important role in language comprehension. (cf. Cohen & Kehler's **conversational elicitures**)
- Can be embedded in iterative reasoning to produce **focal-point effects**. (Schelling, 1960)

Clark (1975); Prince & Cole (1981); Cohen & Kehler (submitted)

### No effect of the prior?

A common assumption is that **intention priors** can be captured through **event priors**. But likely events are not always likely to be talked about, and the most remarkable events are often highly unlikely. Since listeners are inferring intentions, not events, we technically need intention priors, which are difficult to estimate empirically.

### Future research should...

- ...test RSA predictions cross-linguistically: some "ingredients" are **language-specific** (e.g. alternative set; felicity conditions), others are **invariant** across languages (e.g. prior probabilities; reliability).
- ...further explore the reliability effect, and the role of *Informativeness* and non-intentionalist inferences in language comprehension.



{tpoppels | rlevy}  
@ucsd.edu

## References

- Atlas, J., & Levinson, S. (1981). It-clefts, informativeness and logical form: radical pragmatics (revised standard version). *Radical Pragmatics*.
- Clark, H. (1975). Bridging. In *Proceedings of the 1975 workshop on Theoretical issues in natural language processing*. Stroudsburg, PA, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Cohen, J., & Kehler, A. (submitted). Conversational Elicitures.
- Frank, M. C., & Goodman, N. D. (2012). Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games. *Science*, 336(6084), 998–998.
- Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. *The Philosophical Review*, 377–388.
- Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. 1975, 41–58.
- Hawkins, J. A. (1991). On (in)definite articles: implicatures and (un)grammaticality prediction. *Journal of Linguistics*, 27(02), 405.
- Hirschberg, J. (1985). A Theory of Scalar Implicature (Natural Languages, Pragmatics, Inference). *Dissertations Available from ProQuest*.
- Horn, L. R. (1984). Toward a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Inference: Q-based and R-based Implicatures. In D. Schiffrin (Ed.), *Meaning, Form, and Use in Context* (pp. 11–42). Georgetown University Press.
- Horn, L. R. (2004). Implicature. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 3–28). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Jäger, G. (2012). Game theory in semantics and pragmatics. In C. Maienborn, P. Portner & K. von Stechow (Eds.), *Semantics. An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning*, Vol. 3, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2487–2516.
- Levinson, S. C. (2000). *Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature*. MIT Press.
- Prince, E. F., & Cole, P. (1981). Toward a taxonomy of given-new information (pp. 223–255).
- Schelling, T. C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press.
- Zipf, G. (1949). Human behavior and the principle of least effort.